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How cases begin

Of 2,313 regulator documents read for origin statements, 74 (3%) say where a case began: a referral, a surveillance or data-unit detection, an examination. Another 863 only thank other bodies or record a firm's self-report; 1,339 (58%) are silent. SEBI, AMF and Ontario records are not assessed. Silence means the document does not say.

Published 2026-10-04 · 11 min read

Most of what a regulator publishes about a case says what the respondent did and what it cost them. Very little says how the regulator came to look. Reading the closing paragraphs of 2,313 documents for that one thing shows how thin the public record of origins is. Seventy-four documents (3%) say where a case began. Another 863 thank a named body for help, or record that the respondent reported itself, and 37 ASIC releases note that ASIC referred the matter on to a prosecutor. The other 1,339 (58%) are silent, and 245 of those do no more than name the staff who ran the investigation.

Silence is not evidence that a case had no referral, tip or surveillance alert behind it. It means the document does not say. A regulator that chose not to name its source, or whose house style leaves the credit paragraph out, looks the same here as a case that began cold. Everything below is a count of what the documents say, and none of it is a count of how cases actually start.

How it was measured

The records in the library each link to the regulator’s own release, order or notice. For every record the script finds the cached copy of that document, reduces it to the body text (cutting menus, footers and the whistleblower links in every CFTC page footer), splits it into sentences and runs a list of phrase patterns. The script is scripts/analysis/how-cases-begin.mjs; it reads the case files and the cache, fetches nothing, and prints every number used here.

The library now holds 3,273 records. Of those, 2,313 could be assessed. The 209 AMF France records are not assessed: the AMF’s decisions are in French and follow a different format, and a detector built on English phrases would report silence that means nothing. The 656 SEBI records are not assessed either, although SEBI’s orders are in English; the reason is in the next subsection. The 69 Ontario Capital Markets Tribunal records link to a proceeding index page that lists documents but carries no narrative, and 26 SEC administrative-proceeding records have no cached copy of the page they link to. All four groups are left out of every denominator below.

The detector looks for explicit wording only. It sorts what it finds into tiers:

A fifth thing, naming the staff who conducted the investigation, is recorded but is not an origin statement. Credit is also not origin: a body thanked for assistance may have started the matter or may only have helped with it, and the sentences rarely say which.

Figures are as of 2026-10-07. Compared with the 2026-10-05 version, 21 records that were not individual enforcement matters (16 SEC subpoena-enforcement applications, three CFTC umbrella announcements, a CFTC notice and a dismissed OSC motion) were removed from the library. That lowered the assessed set from 2,333 to 2,313 and moved most counts by one to four; the explicit-origin count went from 75 to 74. The SEBI records (489 added on 2026-10-07, 167 more on 2026-10-09, 656 in all) are not assessed. Earlier changes still apply. The status of 543 of the 733 records that had status “filed” was researched and updated (180 remain filed), which shapes the status comparison below, and the parallel-criminal-case flag was corrected (811 records now true), which shapes that comparison.

Why SEBI is not assessed

SEBI’s orders are in English, so the detector can read them, and the question was whether it should. I ran it as a trial on the first 489 SEBI records, of which 232 had order text in the ingest cache (the other 257 had none), then read the results. The detector flagged 15 orders as explicit origin statements. Reading them, at most about half were real. After the library grew to 656 SEBI records the trial covers 372 cached orders (284 have no cached text) and flags 20; I did not read the five additional matches, so the reading above stands for the first 15 only. The rest matched a respondent’s own argument about procedure, a passage on how an earlier case began, or a sentence about a different proceeding. In the other direction, in a random sample of 40 cached orders that I read for origin wording, at least six state an origin the detector did not flag: an investigation begun on a BSE internal alert, a referral from the Income Tax Department, a complaint received by SEBI, a letter from a goods-and-services-tax authority, an NSE analysis of trading and a BSE examination.

SEBI’s wording (“alert”, “reference”, “examination”, “complaint received”) is not the idiom the rules were written for, which came from US, Australian and British releases, and “hereinafter referred to as” appears in nearly every order. The wider scope of the library’s SEBI records (issuer and broker fraud with fraud-regulation findings, and dismissed allegations, not only trading manipulation) is a further reason: many of those orders are about disclosures, funds or client dealings, where how the matter began is described differently again. A run would have produced a rate that was both inflated by false matches and understated by misses, so SEBI is left out of every denominator rather than reported with a number that means little. Writing SEBI rules and checking them against a read sample would be separate work. The trial can be repeated with ORIGINS_TRY_SEBI=1. This reading was done by one AI agent, not a lawyer, on a sample of 40, so treat “at least six” as a floor and not a rate.

How accurate the detector is

I read the matched sentence, and where it was ambiguous the paragraph around it, for 164 detected records: all 75 explicit-origin documents, all 21 self-reports, 8 of the 39 hand-offs and a random 60 of the 896 credit documents. (Those are the counts of the 2026-10-05 run. The removal of 21 non-matter records lowered them to 74, 20, 39 and 893. The reading was not repeated, so the sample statements stay as measured on the earlier set.) In the final version every one of those was a statement of the kind claimed. That is optimistic, because the rules were adjusted over several rounds of exactly this reading: early versions fired on a sentence about a referral fee, on a respondent’s cooperation, on a person named as assisting the investigators, on an internal committee referral and on a rule telling firms to report themselves. Each of these was found by reading, then vetoed or rewritten.

For the other direction I read 134 documents the detector had passed over, stratified by document family, looking at the opening, the closing paragraphs and every sentence containing a suspect word. In three rounds, 7 hid a statement the detector of the day had missed (5%): two examination-led origins, two credits to SEC specialist units, a credit to a US Attorney’s office, a credit to a state commission and one firm bringing its own conduct to the FCA. After each round the rules were widened and the whole set re-run. The last fresh sample of 45 found one miss (2%), and that is the only measure not tuned on the same records. A reasonable summary is that at least 95% of the documents counted as silent really say nothing explicit about origin or credit, and that the explicit-origin count of 74 is probably a small undercount, not an overcount.

A second pass counted a few headline figures a different way, by searching the plain text for the thanks wording and a fixed window after it. FINRA credited in SEC litigation releases came to 329 by that method against 332 in the script; the FBI 370 against 371; the CME Group in CFTC releases 55 against 69, because the simple method looked only at the first thanks sentence. (Those comparisons were made on 2026-10-04; the script now gives 332, 371 and 68.)

What the documents say

Share of each kind of document that says anything about where a case came from or who helpedA horizontal bar chart of how many documents in each family carry at least one of four kinds of statement: an explicit origin, a firm reporting itself, a credit to another body, or an ASIC referral to a prosecutor. CFTC press releases lead with 231 of 334 (69 percent), then SEC litigation releases with 675 of 1,198 (56 percent), ASIC media releases with 51 of 113 (45 percent), FCA final notices with 4 of 48 (8 percent), SEC administrative orders with 12 of 559 (2 percent) and SEC judge decisions with 1 of 61 (2 percent). Of 2,313 documents assessed, 974 (42 percent) carry one. The 69 Ontario tribunal records, the 209 AMF France records (French-language decisions), the 656 SEBI records (English orders whose origin wording the detector does not recognise) and 26 SEC records without a cached document are not in the denominators.CFTC press releases 69% 231 of 334SEC litigation releases 56% 675 of 1,198ASIC media releases 45% 51 of 113FCA final notices 8% 4 of 48SEC administrative orders 2% 12 of 559SEC judge decisions 2% 1 of 61

The gaps are mostly a matter of document type. SEC litigation releases are short announcements that often end with two sentences, one naming the investigators and one thanking other bodies. SEC administrative orders and judge decisions are the order or decision itself, which has no such paragraph: none of the 559 orders carries a credit, and the 12 that say anything are firms reporting themselves. CFTC press releases carry a thanks paragraph in about seven in ten (230 of 334). FCA final notices describe the conduct and the penalty in numbered paragraphs, and four of the 48 record a firm reporting its own conduct to the Authority.

Document familyAssessedExplicit originSelf-report onlyCredit onlyASIC hand-offSilent
SEC litigation releases1,1985906160523
SEC administrative orders55901200547
SEC judge decisions61100060
CFTC press releases334232260103
ASIC media releases11312113762
FCA final notices48040044
All2,3137420843371,339

Each document is counted once, in the highest tier it reaches. Of the 523 silent SEC litigation releases, 240 name the investigators and nothing else.

The 74 explicit statements

Sixty are SEC documents (39, 19 and 2 in the three groups below), 12 are ASIC and 2 are CFTC; none is an FCA notice, and none is a whistleblower award.

Whistleblower awards appear in none of the 2,313 documents. The SEC and the CFTC both run award programmes, and 63 documents carry the standard notice that whistleblowers can receive part of the sanctions, but awards are announced separately and none is attached to these case records. One release mentions complaints from the public, the ASIC raid above, and none mentions a tip or a whistleblower as the source. That is a fact about how releases are written; it says nothing about how many cases begin that way.

The SEC’s explicit statements are also getting more common. Among SEC litigation releases, 24 of 726 filed from 2015 to 2021 (3%) carry one, against 35 of 467 filed from 2022 to 2026 (7%). The rise comes from Analysis and Detection Center statements, 12 filed in the first period and 22 in the second, while examination-led ones fell from 12 to 7. It shows a change in what the releases say, not in how many cases begin that way.

Who is thanked

Which kinds of body the 893 credit statements name, as a share of documents that credit anyoneA horizontal bar chart, for the 893 documents that thank or credit at least one named body, of the share naming each kind of body. US prosecutors and federal agents (US Attorney offices, the Department of Justice, the FBI, the Postal Inspection Service, IRS Criminal Investigation) appear in 541 documents (61 percent), FINRA in 333 (37 percent), foreign regulators in 151 (17 percent), the SEC or CFTC own specialist units in 115 (13 percent), state regulators, prosecutors and local police in 92 (10 percent), exchanges and the National Futures Association in 90 (10 percent), other US regulators in 48 (5 percent) and foreign police and prosecutors in 19 (2 percent). Shares add to more than 100 because a document can credit several kinds of body.US prosecutors and agents 61% 541 documentsFINRA 37% 333Foreign regulators 17% 151SEC or CFTC own units 13% 115State regulators, police 10% 92Exchanges and the NFA 10% 90Other US regulators 5% 48Foreign police, prosecutors 2% 19

Of the 2,313, 893 documents credit at least one named body, and the same few names run through them. US Attorney’s offices are named in 482, the FBI in 446 and FINRA in 333. The Department of Justice itself (59), IRS Criminal Investigation (40) and the Postal Inspection Service (27) follow. Many documents credit several kinds at once: 122 name three or more kinds of body.

Foreign regulators appear in 151: the UK FCA or its predecessor in 70, Canadian provincial and national bodies in 47, Asian regulators in 42 and European ones in 37, but those counts overlap, because a single long thanks list can name bodies from a dozen jurisdictions. Seventy-five of the 151 are SEC releases and 76 are CFTC releases. Exchanges and the National Futures Association are named in 90 documents, and 89 of the 90 are CFTC press releases: the CME Group in 68 (20% of all CFTC releases), the NFA in 19 and ICE in 7. The SEC rarely credits an exchange: one of 1,198 litigation releases does so, whereas FINRA is credited in 332 of them (28%). The SEC and CFTC credit each other in 35 CFTC releases and 5 SEC ones.

The SEC’s own units are credited in 115 documents, usually in a sentence saying a named analyst from the Market Abuse Unit, the Analysis and Detection Center, the Office of Market Intelligence or the Office of Investigative and Market Analytics helped. In 28 of those, no outside body is credited at all.

Which techniques mention whom

The mix of bodies depends on the technique, though the table below mixes this with the kind of case. SEC litigation releases have a large enough sample to compare, so the comparison is within them.

SEC litigation releases by technique: how many credit FINRA, US prosecutors or agents, a foreign regulator, or anyoneA grid of counts for the 1,198 SEC litigation releases assessed, one row per technique tag, shaded by each cell as a share of the row total. Insider trading (390 releases) credits FINRA in 217, US prosecutors or agents in 157, a foreign regulator in 19 and anyone in 281. Ponzi schemes (289): 8, 96, 10 and 135. Pump and dump (103): 41, 33, 19 and 53. Unregistered distributions (66): 9, 13, 5 and 18. Boiler rooms (52): 13, 17, 4 and 26. Undisclosed control blocks (50): 20, 14, 10 and 24. Paid stock promotion (35): 9, 11, 3 and 14. A release can carry several technique tags, so rows overlap.releasesFINRAUSprosecutors,agentsForeignregulatorAny creditInsider 217 157 19 281390Ponzi 8 96 10 135289Pump 41 33 19 53103Unreg. 9 13 5 1866Boiler 13 17 4 2652Control 20 14 10 2450Promo 9 11 3 1435

In the grid, “Insider” is insider trading, “Pump” pump and dump, “Unreg.” unregistered distributions, “Boiler” boiler rooms, “Control” undisclosed control blocks and “Promo” paid stock promotion. A release with two technique tags appears in both rows.

Among the smaller groups, 14 of 35 paid stock promotion releases credit someone and 26 of 52 boiler-room releases do; price manipulation (14 of 21) is too small to treat as a rate.

For CFTC press releases the pattern differs. Spoofing (72 releases) credits an exchange in 50 (69%), and 57 (79%) credit anyone. Price manipulation (55) credits foreign regulators in 29 (53%) and US prosecutors or agents in 26 (47%). Benchmark-submission rigging (18) credits foreign regulators in 15 and US prosecutors or agents in 15, a sample too small for more than a description. Ponzi schemes (109) credit US prosecutors or agents in 55 (50%) and an exchange in 11 (10%). So the names differ by technique: exchanges in spoofing releases, overseas authorities in price manipulation. The releases do not say what each body supplied; how spoofing gets caught covers what the records show of detection.

For ASIC the explicit origin statements are few and cluster in insider trading: 7 of 55 insider-trading releases (13%) and 3 of 36 price-manipulation ones (8%). Another 38 ASIC releases (37 with no other kind of statement) note that ASIC referred the matter to the Commonwealth prosecutor, which says who brought the criminal case and not how ASIC found it.

Two things that sit behind the technique differences

The parallel criminal case. Among SEC litigation releases, 337 of the 525 flagged as having a criminal parallel (64%) credit US prosecutors or agents, against 89 of the 673 without one (13%). In CFTC releases it is 79 of 108 (73%) against 36 of 226 (16%). Technique differences partly follow this: insider trading has 181 criminal parallels in 390 SEC releases and Ponzi schemes 142 in 289. A thanks paragraph to a prosecutor goes with a criminal case running alongside, whatever the technique. The flag was corrected on 128 records on 2026-10-04 (113 set to false because the release states no criminal case, 15 set to true), which narrowed the gap: earlier counts of 74% against 3% (SEC) and 82% against 9% (CFTC) rested on a flag that was too generous. Part of the remaining 13% and 16% without the flag may be criminal cases the release does not mention.

The stage of the case. Of SEC litigation releases with status “filed”, 86 of 147 (59%) credit someone; for “settled” it is 325 of 486 (67%), and for “judgment” 239 of 546 (44%). Many judgment releases are follow-ups to a case announced years before, and they tend to carry the investigators’ names and nothing else. Record status is a flawed measure: it records the outcome as researched, often for some defendants only, and 180 records across the library are still marked “filed” because no outcome was found.

What this does not show

Reproducing the counts

Run node scripts/analysis/how-cases-begin.mjs out.json (set ORIGINS_TEXT_DIR to a folder to cache the extracted text between runs). It reads src/content/cases/*.json and the cached documents under .cache/, takes about half a minute, and writes the full output: coverage by agency and document type, counts of each kind of statement, the named bodies, and the technique, year, criminal-parallel and status breakdowns. PDF text is extracted with the unpdf package the ingest pipeline already uses. The phrase list is in the script, along with the list of sentences it vetoes.

Techniques referenced

Cases referenced

Action Agency Filed Technique Penalty Status
SEC v. Bryan Cohen and George Nikas (insider trading, 2019) SEC 2019-10-22 Insider Trading — settled
SEC v. Brian Wong (insider trading, 2022) SEC 2022-11-10 Insider Trading — settled
SEC v. Edward Constantin, et al. (social media ramps, 2022) SEC 2022-12-14 Social Media Ramps — filed
SEC v. George Heckler (2021) SEC 2021-07-28 — settled
SEC v. Terren S. Peizer and Acuitas Group Holdings, LLC (insider trading, 2023) SEC 2023-03-08 Insider Trading — dismissed
Former Genetic Technologies CEO convicted of market manipulation (ASIC, 2014) ASIC 2014-11-05 Price Manipulation — judgment
Sydney man jailed on insider trading charges (ASIC, 2016) ASIC 2016-06-03 Insider Trading — judgment
Charges laid in Platinum Asset Management insider trading case (ASIC, 2025) ASIC 2025-08-12 Insider Trading — judgment
Operators of 'binary options trading boiler room' convicted and sentenced (ASIC, 2017) ASIC 2017-11-09 — judgment
ASIC v. Openmarkets Australia Limited (market integrity rules, 2023) ASIC 2023-07-05 — settled
CFTC v. Logista Advisors LLC (spoofing, 2017) CFTC 2017-09-29 Spoofing $250k judgment
CFTC v. Heet Khara and Nasim Salim (spoofing, 2015) CFTC 2015-05-05 Spoofing — judgment
CFTC v. Navinder Singh Sarao (layering, 2016) CFTC 2016-11-17 Layering , Price Manipulation +1 $25.7m judgment
FCA v. The Royal Bank of Scotland plc (FX benchmark manipulation, 2014) FCA 2014-11-11 FX Fixing — settled

Reviewed October 4, 2026. Spotted an error? Tell us.